Big stink in Colombo likely to worsen

By Aisha Edris
(Photos by Nissanka Wijeratne)
The garbage crisis in Colombo is likely to worsen with the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) still not willing to evolve a proper scientific mechanism to dispose garbage.Dumping of domestic waste – an antiquated practice of a bygone era continues even today, with CMC officials authorised to deal with solid waste disposal, so far failing to come up with a recommendation for a proper scientific method of disposal , to the government.

The CMC that has failed to look into alternative disposal methods has also not so far sought expert advice as to how garbage could be re-used for various useful purposes.According to CMC officials an estimated 800 to 900 tons of garbage is collected on a daily basis from the Colombo Municipal limits alone and the council pays Rs. 800 per ton to Berns Environmental Services Pvt, Ltd. The council therefore pays an estimated sum of Rs. 650,000 to Berns on a monthly basis.

Having paid this colossal amount, the rate payers still find there has not been any significant improvement in the collection and disposal of the garbage.

Alternative methods
Questions have been raised as to why the CMC has not considered alternative methods of disposing garbage. In the past, the CMC followed the unscientific practice of dumping garbage in open spaces, in natural seepages and marsh lands or Keerakotuwa. Now however, CMC officials say that Colombo has reached a saturation point and there are no more open spaces to throw domestic waste.
During the period 1998/99 the World Bank was prepared to grant financial assistance to construct a disposal site in Meepe in Avissawella. The cost of the project was estimated at Rs. 800 million. The World Bank offer was made on the eve of the 1999 provincial council election.
However this offer was rejected by the then government citing various reasons. One was the cost that would incur to transport garbage from Colombo to Meepe every day. As a result the contract was rejected.
Passing the buck

The CMC has conveniently put the blame on the central government for not helping the council to solve this crisis, while the central government has blamed the council for not recommending a proper method to solve the garbage problem. According to the Municipal Council Ordinance garbage that is collected in public places is the property of the council and therefore the council is legally bound to collect and dispose of it. Meanwhile the central government, quoting the law, says that disposal of garbage should be done without inconveniencing the public.

Despite there being no available land to dump the garbage within the Colombo municipal limits, the central government is nonetheless expected to find alternative grounds, CMC officials counter charge.According to Jagath Gunawardene, an environmentalist, Berns which had entered into an irrevocable agreement with the CMC to collect and dispose garbage, had not sought approval from the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) for environmental clearance , which a company requires if the input is more than 80 tones per day.

He said if proper permission had been sought, the CEA would have provided an alternative space to dump waste.Meanwhile the CEA officials also charged that the garbage site at Bloemendhal area was illegal. When questioned, the CMC Chief Medical Officer Dr. Pradeep Kariyawasam said the council was saddled with problems of finding spaces to dump garbage.He also said the council was not in a position to oust those people who were living close to the dumping grounds.

Residents living next to the dumping ground in turn stressed that they would not leave their present ‘home,’ until the government found them alternative locations.Meanwhile The Nation learns that Environment Minister Champika Ranawaka has already given his officials a three year time period to resolve the garbage crisis.

Lalith Wickremaratne, Director Solid Waste CMC, refused to make any comments regarding this saying the newspaper should obtain prior approval from the CMC Commissioner for his comments.
“Without the commissioner’s approval we can’t talk to the press. First, get permission from the Commissioner. Then I will talk,” he said.

Lack of innovation
The CMC has been roundly condemned by rate payers for its lack of innovation.During an investigation The Nation learnt that the CMC was not keen to introduce new techniques to solve this crisis.When incinerators were suggested by the rate payers, the CMC said they were too expensive to purchase.

When dumping garbage elsewhere was suggested, the council members again spoke of the cost factor. However it was observed that the CMC did not mind paying a staggering Rs. 650,000 per month to Berns. This has led to suspicion. Several CMC officials on the grounds of anonymity, told The Nation that many top officials were benefiting out of the agreement with Berns, and therefore did not wish to recommend or even consider alternative methods.

“If the council can spend this amount of money to dump garbage, the council can spend the same amount by recycling the garbage or burning it. Dumping is an old, unacceptable method today. But yet CMC is still clinging on to this outdated method without moving forward to find modern ways of extracting energy from waste by using scientific methods,” several concerned rate payers pointed out.

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Lessons from the `vanished’ tsunami

By Chanuka Wattegama
If the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was a disaster marked by inaction, what happened on September 12, 2007 was marked by plenty of action, but a dearth of right action. It was certainly not an exemplary implementation of pre-determined and meticulously planned disaster avoidance activities. Did it make the vulnerable communities feel more secure? Or did it merely add to the confusion and chaos? Wasn’t what happened on that crucial evening another good lesson on how not to react to a disaster? Does this mean we still have lot to learn?

Risk mitigation through disaster warning is a serious business. It is not as simple as a politician or a government official calling the national TV station and ordering evacuations or worse, the closure of roads. It is an end-to-end process with the hazard monitors at one end and communities at the other. In between are many intermediaries with defined roles. They are expected to play their assigned roles, not exceed their roles and not to play the role of others. If this balance is broken somewhere, as we have seen, it can lead to adverse consequences.

NDWC response
The prediction of a tsunami is an inexact art that must be practiced in conditions of highly imperfect information and time pressure. In the Pacific Basin, which has had the most experience with tsunamis, 75 per cent of all warnings are false. But this does not cause major harm because the false warnings are contained within the official system and do not get through to the general population for the most part.

The decision to issue public warning should be taken by the professionals after careful analysis. This does not mean that they should always be perfect. Neither does it mean that the decision should be deliberated till all the information is available, which is impractical. On the other hand, there is also no need to compromise accuracy for speed, as shown by the National Disaster Warning Center (NDWC) Thailand. May be that could be an example for disaster management practitioners everywhere.

The Thai authorities could not have underestimated the situation in the light of the fact that their country being the fourth hardest hit nation in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. But still they saw no reason to issue a public warning. All that the NDWC did was to broadcast a message telling people there was no cause for alarm, three hours later. NDWC chairman Smith Dharmasarojana said later the delay was based on a thorough analysis of the situation. The Centre followed warning procedures correctly and alerted the government and provincial officials. He also said that though it was the job of the NDWC to monitor earthquakes around the clock, telling people to evacuate arbitarily would only panic people with no productive results. Therefore NDWC saw no reason to press the panic buttons unnecessarily.

In spite of the NDWC’s superior response, the Thai press still saw plenty of room for improvement. ‘Centre Chairman Smith Dharmasarojana was entirely correct not to issue a tsunami alert for the southern provinces after the 8.4-magnitude quake off the west coast of Sumatra.’ wrote the Bangkok Post in its editorial on September 18, 2007, ‘But he and his staff need to quickly go back to the drawing board and revise their operations. Otherwise the Centre risks losing all credibility quickly.’
So, what more could have been done?

‘The worldwide news networks began reporting the killer quake within minutes after it happened. At about the same time, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) issued a statement that a tsunami was possible and could endanger virtually any littoral countries on the Indian Ocean. The website of the Centre specifically mentioned Thailand, and so did the news reports, which quickly reached the Thai media and all the country. What happened after that was sadly predictable. Thousands of people in the six Andaman coastal provinces left their homes, offices and hotels and headed for higher ground. Many spent the entire night on the hills and in the mountains, fearing a tsunami despite -- or because of -- the lack of official information. Rumours spread, groundless but seemingly authentic, that waves were headed towards Phuket, and would hit at 10pm, nearly four hours after the earthquake.

‘The public must be fair but critical about last Wednesday’s earthquake and follow-up. On the one hand, any more false alarms or botched warnings will sink the credibility of the disaster office. On the other, the country --especially the Andaman coastal provinces-- are decidedly tense if not downright frightened about the possibility of another tsunami. They will always try to look after themselves, families and neighbours no matter what officials say. Therefore, Mr Smith and his Centre face a severe crisis of credibility, and must move quickly to explain how they will overcome it.’ (Bangkok Post, Sept 18, 2007)
Media

If this were the media reaction to the sensible and correct response of Thailand, what can be said of the over- reaction elsewhere?
Several countries issued public disaster alerts/warnings and (in some cases) evacuation orders. These included not just Asian countries but few African ones as well. Mozambican, Tanzanian and South African authorities warned people living on the Indian Ocean coastal stretch of the possibility of a tsunami but did not initiate any evacuations. Kenya went one step further by starting evacuation. Africa’s Indian Ocean islands of the Seychelles and Mauritius, which suffered some physical losses in 2004 December, maintained a close watch but did not issue warnings. Somalia, the only African country to experience significant losses in 2004 (300 deaths) issued no alert.

In Thiruvanthapuram, South India, the district administration kept police and officials on vigil to carry out mass evacuations, the need for which did not arise. At tourist spots, the visitors received information with equanimity. By that time, television news channels had started airing news of the tsunami alert but there was no panic.
In Southern Bangladesh, on the other hand, it was reported that more than half a million people in the coastal areas fled their homes in panic. They took shelter in schools, other buildings, cyclone shelters and relatives’ houses. This was after an official warning broadcast via television and radio. Police with loud-speakers were said to be “expediting” the process. People were asked to stay the night at the shelters till the government lifted the warning on the early hours of the following day morning. Officials in Chittagong were apparently satisfied about the efficacy of the evacuation operations.

The Lankan scenario
The situation in Sri Lanka was not too different. Perhaps it was even less orderly. Tsunami warnings and evacuation orders came in quick succession. Phone networks were immediately congested. Radio and television stations were running after the officials as if it was a marathon, with officials making the most out of their 15 minutes of fame .One gave a complete lecture on how tsunamis originate – wasting precious air time. Some roads were closed for unknown reasons. Even a heavily attended book exhibition attended by thousands at a location more than one km from the coast was closed early on account of the impending tsunami adding to traffic congestion. Later local media reported incidents of looting of evacuated houses. The alerts worked – perhaps too well – but the question was whether it was necessary to undergo all this hassle for a hazard which had extremely low probability of converting to a massive disaster, and especially when it was not so difficult to determine the impact.

The differentiation between the words ‘alert’ and ‘warning’ is important. There is nothing wrong in requesting the communities to keep vigil, even when the risk is minor. That harms no one. The danger is pushing it further and making it a ‘warning’ – an event that requires an action response. Warnings can cause panic and should be avoided till the last possible moment. Possibly the word `watch’ which is used in North America, should replace the word `alert’ to reduce the likelihood of confusion.

Politicians
In some countries it was reported that politicians are at the helm of disaster warnings. This was akin to the donkey who attempted to play the role of the dog to win his master’s favour. Considering the previous experience, their concern is understandable, but this usurpation of roles can cause serious undesired outcomes. Politicians are not trained to judge a prospective disaster. For them, it is more a game of guessing. This could mean evacuations following every earthquake on one extreme or at the other, no warnings when the threat is real. So it is better not to assign the politicians the role of guardian angels. Qualified and trained professionals must take decisions, of course, in consultation with the political authorities.

These were not the only lessons. According to reports, the level of ICT use in the warning process was not optimal. Multiple media such as fixed and mobile phones, SMS, fax and the Internet can be used more productively. Redundancy improves reliability. Using Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) enabled media, can help streamline the process and expedite messages. Where message--length limitations exist, as in SMS, the short message can be used to direct the recipient to the place where the complete message can be obtained.

Community preparedness
Community preparedness also helps the national-level decision makers. If they know that the community is prepared and capable of responding quickly and in an orderly manner to an evacuation order, they can delay the ‘strong measures’ until absolutely necessary. It is when that confidence is lacking that there is a tendency to issue warnings and evacuation orders too early.

In the disaster risk-reduction field, false warnings are not seen as being a result of malice or incompetence. They are simply artefacts of the inexact art of predicting the onset of hazards. Professionals know this, but the general public does not. If they are subject to too many false warnings, the general public will not respond even to true warnings. If this unsavoury outcome is to be avoided it is essential that the call of the Sri Lanka Minister of Disaster Management for an immediate review of the September 12th response be taken seriously, not only in Sri Lanka, but in the entire region.

This article is a first response to the Minister’s call.
Chanuka Wattegama, author ‘ICT for Disaster Management’(UNDP) has also contributed chapters to ‘Media’s challenge – Asian tsunami and beyond’ (AMIC) and ‘Communication Disasters’. (UNDP and TVEAP) He now works at LIRNEasia and can be contacted at wattegama@lirne.net.

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