Military Matters

Military ups the ante in the Wanni

While consolidating its gains, the military is steadily ‘pegging away’ at the Tigers’ ‘resources’ to weaken its resolve

The army, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai. The LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances.

Two months back, on August 5, Senpathi made a pertinent observation: “With the Wanni waiting to flare up and the buildup already reported previously, the question is which side would take the initiative? The LTTE has two options, either to dig in with a formidable defence or, pre-empt with a strike.”
With the Wanni flaring up with battle after battle, during the past fortnight, we now have the benefit of hindsight to say which side actually took the initiative.
The Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) quoting unnamed sources yesterday said: “Troops have effectively neutralised successive LTTE attempts to advance into military defence lines separating non liberated Wanni area.”
Midweek, intense fighting erupted west of Omantai at Vilattikulam, when a limited operation was organized by the 57 offensive Division headed by Brig. Jagath Dias, who took over exactly two months back. (His predecessor, Sumith Manawadu, was transferred days after the 57 Brigade at Kalmadu army camp, came under LTTE artillery fire and the military base of the 16th Battalion of the Artillery Regiment at Pompaimadu, west of Vavuniya, came under attack on June 2).
There was a major reshuffle within the command structure in the Wanni and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya who took over as Security Forces Commander (SFC) Wanni five weeks back, coordinated the latest operations.
The Vilattikulam operation that lasted till the following morning- Thursday, was undertaken by the 6th Battalion of the Vijayaba Regiment (VR) under Maj. Sisira Pilapitiya assisted by the 8th Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (GR) and the 4th Battalion of the VR.
Troops advanced toward the LTTE stronghold, captured a mortar base, a communication centre and several bunkers. Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of the Sinha Regiment under Col. G.S. Welikalage, assisted by the 9th Battalion of the GR fought for the LTTE stronghold in Pokkravanni, where LTTE Maj. Jeyam was killed in the attack.
In the recent fighting, 19 soldiers including 14 from the 9 GR were wounded in action (wia), two soldiers including Capt. Soysa were killed in action (kia) and another three, were classified missing in action (mia).
According to intercepted LTTE messages, the Tigers’ head of administration in the area, Solan, who was in charge of supplies to the Forward Defence Lines (FDL), was killed when a cab carrying Tiger cadres exploded. A tractor carrying supplies to Tigers was also destroyed by the army.
So, it appears, the LTTE has taken the first option. It has dug in with a formidable defence and responded in the face of the military offensives.
Attack and Retreat
During the past couple of months, the military had launched lightning operations from a dozen places in the Wanni. But, it has not been all that successful in penetrating this jungle terrain. At most points, the Tigers that had to flee the east, over several months, until Thoppigala, the last bastion fell, have joined in the defence.
What is more, the LTTE has struck back hard, forcing the military to flee in most instances. It hit back with a barrage of mortar fire and rained artillery shells on the targets. The Tigers also used direct fire to push back the military’s FDLs that had advanced in some places.
The military, which controls the A-14 Road from Medawachchiya to Mannar, has tried to penetrate the Wanni from various points west of the A-9 Road along the Omanthai–Vavuniya stretch. It happened at Thirukeswaram, Andankulam, and west of Giant’s Tank, Periyamadu, Palampiddi, Vilattikulam, Pokkaravanni, Iranai Illuppaikkulam, Periyathampanai and Thampanai among other places.
The military claims it ended up killing dozens of Tigers and destroying enemy bunkers in the ensuing confrontations. In clashes on Friday at Navathkulam and Periyathampane areas, it claimed two Tiger were killed and six others wounded, while four soldiers were also injured.
Nine LTTE cadres were reportedly killed this week in an attack west of Thampane, but MCNS says 16 Tigers were killed and the bodies of four were recovered. A fortnight back, on September 22, a Capt. and two soldiers died and 22 wounded in a battle in Thampane that lasted several hours and went late into the night.
Operations west of the Giant’s Tank in Mannar, have been more frequent. They were undertaken by the Commando Brigade and the STF. Several LTTE bunkers were destroyed, while troops advanced about a kilometer into LTTE territory. However, troops under Capt. Pandita, had to face Tiger mortar fire that injured the officer and two soldiers. Maj. Sarada Samarakoon of the10th Battalion GR, along with the second commando Brigade, advanced up to the LTTE FDLs and destroyed seven Tiger bunkers last week, according to claims. The military also claims that 35 Tigers were killed and 40 more wounded in the confrontations on Wednesday and Thursday, mainly in the area northwest of the Giant Tank. There was no independent confirmation of the casualties.
The main aim of the military is to penetrate the first FDL along the Vidattaltivu-Periyamadu-Mundurmurippu-Puliyayankulam-Marutodai axis from West to East in the Mannar and Vavuniya districts.
Consolidating gains
The military admits that the LTTE has increased its numbers in Vidattaltivu area, where a civilian influx has been observed.
To enter the Mullaitivu district, there is another FDL along the Kannadi-Iramiyankulam-Naddankandal-Kummakulam-Kanakarayankulam axis. Still further up north, there is the Mankulam, Olumadu Oddusudan axis secured by the Tigers in 1999. These bases are located by the main highway that leads to the strategic Elephant Pass complex, the gateway to the northern peninsula. In 2000, the LTTE went for the big kill and overran the Elephant Pass base. Smaller camps such as Nedunkerni, Kanagarayanakulam and Ampagamam, to name a few were also overrun in 1999. While attacking Oddusudan and Mankulan, they took on Weli Oya and overran Puliyankulam and Gajabapura eight-years-ago.
This week, during a confrontation in the Weli Oya area, three Tigers, including an area leader identified as Kalivanan, were killed in counter attacks at Kiriibban Wewa, raising fears whether a third front was likely to open. As the Mannar operations appear to be time consuming, it is unclear whether a front is to be opened up in Weli Oya, where the Tigers, several months ago, said there was a military buildup.
The military claims that the Tigers staged the attack at the Kiriibban Wewa.
Weli Oya has been identified as a vulnerable area with the LTTE possibly eyeing this place, to begin its strike. But, it has to make sure it succeeds.
The Weli Oya Command also changed hands from Maj. Gen. Nimal Jayasuriya to Brig. M.K. Jayawardena. At the time Jayasuriya took over Weli Oya, there was no FDL between Padaviya and Kebethhigollewa, which was attacked twice last year.
As the military had identified Weli Oya as a probable target of the Tigers, Gen. Jayasuriya had a 25-km bunker line constructed to prevent raids on villages in Weli Oya. A stretch of five-km of no man’s land between Kokkutuduvai, almost on the east coast, and Janakapura, was a tactical disadvantage to the army. The former Weli Oya commander had a fortified bunker line built linking Janakapura.
On Tuesday (02) security forces launched an attack and destroyed an LTTE boat after detecting a cluster of Tiger boats, in the seas off Kokkuthudai in Pulmudai. The battle between security forces and sea tigers which lasted nearly three hours ended around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday (03). The forces used heavy artillery, mortar and small arms to launch the attack on the cluster of boats.
On the A-9 Road, the army has been restricted to Omantai, far below Puliyankulam. The entry-exit point on this road to the south, is at Omantai and the north at Muhamalai, which along with the Kilali-Nagarkovil axis, still appears impregnable on either side.
The 8th Battalion VR attacked LTTE’s Nargakovil FDL this week and destroyed several bunkers, after an attempt last week did not bring in the desired results. Ten LTTE cadres were killed and about 20 injured in Nagarkovil, while two soldiers were killed during a confrontation again this week on the Kilali FDLs. In attacks the previous week at Kilali, the military claimed that 20 Tigers were killed, as against two soldiers, but the Tigers admitted the deaths of four Tigers and an unknown number of soldiers from the 4th Battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry. Last week too, there were attacks at Muhamalai and the trend appears to be frequent lighting attacks to weaken the Tigers, but the status quo on the ground remains and any area secured eventually, had to be conceded. Military, officials and the army top brass repeated ad nauseum, that taking control of real estate was not their intention.
Then, what is the military gain, we may ask?
Gnawing away at the Tigers
As we see it, it is a war of attrition or at least, such a phase, the military is currently engaged in. Destroying Tiger bunkers has been another strategy employed by the military in its recent limited offensives. In the process, it is only logical that the military sustains losses in the north and the Wanni. In the East, there were lesser casualties and the Tigers withdrew to fight another day, and that is in the Wanni.
It its cold calculation of decimating the Tigers, the military may be blind to the fact that if the Tigers hold out till a change of regime, to recruit, it would state how the LTTE survived arguably, one of the most ferocious phases of the war. The undeclared ‘Eelam War IV’ most certainly, has surpassed the previous one in terms of the concerted efforts of the three forces, skills and tactics employed, the use of artillery, mortar and multi barrel fire, intelligence gathering, support from the ‘Karuna’ group, that almost divided the LTTE into a Wanni and the eastern faction.
Surviving such an onslaught, is enough propaganda for the Tigers to recruit both here and in Tamil Nadu.
So, it is obvious why the LTTE has not taken the second option and initiated attacks, not only in the Wanni but, along the Kilali-Muhamali-Nagarkovil axis?
The LTTE cannot afford to initiate an attack, unless it is sure to succeed? The result of the major attack the Tigers initiated in Muttur and the provocation made in Mavil Aru, is too widely known here and among the diaspora. The August 11 Muhamalai attack staged by the baby brigade and followed by the specialized Charles Anthony Brigade was also a disaster. Not even the Kilali offensive, including the boat landing by Sea Tigers, could make material difference. It was a failed attempt with a capital F.
No wonder then, that LTTE Political Wing Leader, in mid September, said, “The LTTE is maintaining patience and still restricting itself to a defensive war.”
Tigers dig in
The military, however, can afford to take chances, as it has the success story in the “East” to brag about. Nevertheless, the military cannot afford to lose a major battle in terms of territory, casualties or loss of equipment. The October 11 debacle in Muhamalai, in terms of casualties reported and equipment lost, is a grim reminder of the many conventional battles previously lost.
Hence, the recent offensives are lightning attacks by small groups, to limit the loss in terms of casualties.
So, at this rate, it is estimated that the military would take another three to four years to succeed, given that the Tigers are well entrenched and have the added advantage of familiarity with the terrain.
As we said last week, the modus operandi of the security forces was likely to succeed in the Mannar region via the Wanni. We are not denying that the military would eventually succeed, but it would be at such a slow pace that political developments were likely to overtake the military gains.
Political developments are also shaped by economic considerations, and the military would find it difficult to sustain its campaign financially.
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is a master at the game of a protracted struggle and as we said before, has outlived the tenures of governments here, in India and will soon do so in America.
Even if there were to be a change of government, the military has changed the balance of power in the new government’s favour. Having wrested control of the East, the new dispensation, if it intends commencing peace talks, will be able to do so from a position of strength. Contrast this with the UNF’s previous unenviable position in December 2001, with the East also under the Tigers’ belt and the air force depleted, having lost some of its fighters.
The air force has wreaked havoc in this ‘Eelam War IV’, taking on Tiger assets week after week. Repeated attacks staged by fighter jets in Vashvamadu beyond Pudurippu, over a fortnight, have had a huge effect on the LTTE. Where the army is unable to penetrate in the Mullaitivu district, the air force has been pounding sensitive areas. It is reliably understood that bunker buster bombs are also used to target underground facilities.
Naturally, the Tigers who called the shots and negotiated from a vantage position at that time, were able to secure ‘a federal solution.’ The UNP’s recent dropping of the word “federalism”, is a tacit recognition of the military achievements on the ground, sea and air.
If the LTTE refuses to talk peace, which is the likely scenario, as it does not talk from a position of weakness, the alternative might be to continue the war. The military will not agree to a change in the ground situation. Hence, one reason cited by the UNP for this change was a change in the military situation on the ground.

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